This paper focuses on the defining the role of CRO in corporate governance and to show the interrelation between the way of CRO subordination and performance of investment bank. The sample consists of observations over a period of 2011 for 29 biggest investment banks (by amount of assets) implementing world-wide investment activity. The banks are originated in the USA (8), Eastern Europe (14), China (2), Japan (2), Canada (2), and Australia (1). With the aim to evaluate and compare financial performance of selected banks the construction of synthetic key performance indicator (SKPI) is worked out. The empirical analysis of risk management in the research is based on two different groups of factors, which could be used to evaluate the effectiveness of risk management in this sphere: analysis of CRO impact -Risk Management Committee factors and CRO factors, and Evaluation of Financial Performance. Results show that the CRO presence in investment banks effect positively on the financial performance.
Introduction
After recent events of global financial crisis and further recession bank boards became more disturbed about the risk governance issues. The lesson was learned that timely risk oversight and measures to its minimization would lead to stability of a bank. That's why the foundation and ensuring of effective functioning of Risk Management Committee in bank is one of the primary goals in this context. According to Basel Committee recommendations for enhancing corporate governance practice updated in 2010 Risk Management Committee in the lead with Chief Risk Officer (CRO) is responsible for organizing of risk management system, introduction of bank overall risk governance strategy and control of its adherence. These Principles also state that to achieve higher efficiency CRO as a senior executive should have independence.
Let's have a look on how it is realized in today's banks. First of all, some banks (especially in countries with weak or transforming banking systems) don't have special committee to deal with risks at corporate governance level. According to statistical data, in such cases risk governance is delivered to Audit Committee or CEO as one of numerous tasks.
Secondly, we must underline that in most of banks CRO is usually subordinate to CEO, in other cases -to other chief executive (e.g. CFO). To some extension it lengthens a period of reporting and, as a result, of decision-making. Such subordination models can also bring to information asymmetry and to some degree commit the principle of independence. According to recent corporate governance practice in banks CRO may also subordinate straightly to Board. This model of reporting may help to avoid drawbacks mentioned above and to enhance risk governance in the banking institution.
In the context of risk governance one must define obvious difference between its implementation in commercial and investment banks which is explained by the distinctions in their activity. Specific character of investment banking lies down in absence of cash deposits; in selling securities to entities or to the government; in matching sellers and buyers of securities; advising about mergers and acquisitions. The other peculiarity of investment banks is that it doesn't realize lending activities, so their risk tolerance level is higher versus commercial banks. Investment banks serve clients who already may have huge amounts of capital as a rule, while commercial banks (especially retail-oriented) may cater for consumer categories that need the seed capital or need to maintain routine necessities. That explains the total opposite interests among these types of banking.
Summarizing we must note that commercial and investing activity must be distinguished due to specificity of the last.
We must also underline that the problem of liquidity is urgent especially for investment banks. According to new Basel recommendations it is expected to form more reserve buffers to maintain banking activity: it is supposed to direct all retained profits to insure risks by force of risk-weighted asset generation. In this case the problems with liquidity may rise in investment banks due to absence of deposits and incomes from crediting. The effective risk governance may become the way of problemsolving. The idea of distinguishing commercial and investment banking has been suggested in GlassSteagall Act (1933) , Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (1999) , Vickers Report (2010), Volcker Rule (2012) . The recommendation to separate high-risk (proprietary trading of securities and derivatives) and classical banking activities is also stated by the High-level Expert Group to reduce possible risks, both local and systemic 15 . The aim of the investigation is to define the role of CRO in corporate governance and to show the interrelation between the way of CRO subordination and performance of investment bank. As noticed above these problems are urgent nowadays, that totally explains the actuality of this research.
Literature Review
The special role and relationship between the CRO, risk governance and bank has been highlighted in the business newspapers (Dan Borge, 2010 16 ; Eric Holmquist, 2011 17 ; James Lam, 1997 18 ), in various reports (Protiviti Inc, 2011 19 ; Charles R. Lee and Prakash Shimpi, 2005 20 ; Risk Reward Limited, 2010 21 , Barclays PLC Annual Report, 2010 22 ). The main idea of this articles and reviews is that by committing to employing a chief risk officer, the bank creates one central, highly qualified individual that can develop a solid risk framework and assist management in ensuring that it is consistently utilized. As a result, this has a profound impact on reducing losses and preserving capital and shareholder equity.
Nowadays between modern scientists and economists there are several views on the importance and accountability of the CRO. In many instances, the CRO reports to the CFO or CEO, and some CROs have a direst reporting line to the board of directors.
Our study complements Shane Phillips (2011) who examined the CRO`s duties and claimed that CRO must be able to discuss market trends in depth, able to stave off downside exposures early on and help course correct the organizations position. The best CROs have the pulse of the market and are able to stay clear of bubbles before they burst. Moreover, they must possess a deep understanding of their clients' counterparty risk and are able to identify secondary risks in a jiffy. This sometimes means changing strategy mid-stride and can often find them locking horns with business heads.
According to Anette Mikes (2008) 23 distinguish the role of the CRO depending on the type of risk governance function an organization adopts. In this case, the author highlights four types of risk function such as: "compliance champion" -the risk function is focused on delivering compliance with pressing; "modelling expert -the risk function is focused on highly sophisticated risk modelling, and delivering the most advanced measurement and compliance options from the regulatory menu; "strategic adviser" -senior risk officers gain board-level visibility and influence predominantly as a result of the amount of knowledge they command of the business, and experience of what can go wrong; and "strategic controller" -having built sophisticated firm-wide risk models, capable of giving an aggregate view of the financial risks, the risk function enables the company to operate a formal risk-adjusted performance management system. Vincent Aebi, Gabriele Sabato, and Markus Schmid (2011) 24 dedicated to this issue more comprehensive analysis of the influence of the "risk governance" on the banks` performance. Their findings indicate that banks, in which the CRO reports directly to the board of directors, perform significantly better in the financial crisis while banks in which the CRO reports to the CEO perform significantly worse than other banks in our sample. In fact, the main reason for such results, they explain by the conflict of interests, which appears between the CEO and CRO, when one reports to the other. To be more specific, they emphasize that the CEOs' main interest is to maximize growth in sales, assets, and profits -possibly both in the shareholders' as well as his own interest as growth helps to maximize the value of the personal remuneration package as well as prestige and power (e.g., managerial empire building). Hence, the assessment and treatment of risk might be a lower priority for a CEO. Their research underlines the necessity of having CEO and CRO at the same level, ideally both reporting to the board of directors.
Moreover, the burning problems of risk governance are being actively considered by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and there recommendations were presented in the Third Basel Accord (Basel III). The most important issues according risk governance have been implemented in the following recommendations about the increase of requirements for risk governance: banks need to hold 4.5 % of common equity in comparison of 2% in Basel II and 6% of Tier I capital of risk-weighted assets (RWA) in comparison of 4% in Basel II. Basel III offers additional mandatory capital conservation buffer of 2.5% and discretionary countercyclical buffer, which allows national regulators to require up to another 2.5% of capital during periods of high credit growth. In addition, Basel III introduces a minimum 3% leverage ratio and two required liquidity ratios (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010).
Legislative framework
The crisis has denied a number of stereotypes, which existed in the theory and practice of corporate governance recently. Banks continue to face challenges in their activities which are not adequately settled by corporate law.
Risk minimizing issue is one of the most significant tasks in terms of global financial market vulnerability. CRO position is one of the most effective components of the quality risk management system, which plays an important role in the decision making process.
Below it's considered how the responsibilities and requirements for the CRO defined in the principles, codes and rules of corporate governance, which are recognized as the major in the field. For convenience, they're divided into four main groups (all acts included are in the 25 . German CG Code establish some rules for Supervisory Board structure including audit committee: "The Supervisory Board shall set up an Audit Committee which, in particular, handles issues of accounting, risk governance and compliance, the necessary independence required of the auditor, the issuing of the audit mandate to the auditor, the determination of auditing focal points and the fee agreement" 26 . So it combines the risk governance and audit functions. In the UK CG Code the section C is devoted to "Risk Management and Internal Control". It states that "the board is responsible for determining the nature and extent of the significant risks it is willing to take in achieving its strategic objectives. The board should maintain sound risk governance and internal control systems" 27 and identify the role, functions and responsibilities of audit committee.
Basic reports in Corporate Governance include a lot of published papers in different regulation issues: «The Modern Corporation and Private Property», "Report of the National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting", "Cadbury Report. The Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance", "King Report on Corporate Governance", "Rutteman Report on Internal Control and Financial Reporting", "Greenbury Report on Directors Remuneration", "Vienot Report. . It states that executives are responsible for the identification, assessment, management and monitoring of risk, for developing, operating and monitoring the system of internal control and for providing assurance to the board that it has done so 29 . The role, responsibility and requirements to CRO are not mentioned. The Turnbull Report pays a lot of attention to the risk management issues. It identifies the components of internal control system and stages of assessing the effectiveness of the company's risk and control processes, role of Board of directors, Managers and Auditors 30 . But all issues connected to risk manager's appointment requirements are not considered, and it did not require, the board to express an opinion on the effectiveness of the system.
One of the most important reports in to corporate governance in banking is David Walker's one (2009). It includes recommendations on board size, composition and qualification, functioning of the board and evaluation of performance, the role of institutional shareholders, remuneration and governance of risk. The last one contains requirements for FTSE 100-listed bank or Life Insurance Company to establish a board risk committee separately from the audit committee, with the chief risk officer reporting in to the committee as well as the chief executive. In addition, the risk committee should be chaired by a non-executive director, who should carry out a due diligence appraisal of any strategic transaction as a matter of good practice 31 . Specific International Banking Regulation Rules are issued by Basel Committee. They consists of set of Basel requirements on capital adequacy, liquidities normative and corporate governance standards issued in 1988 , 2006 , 2009 , 2010 and 2011 .
The Basel recommendations are an attempt to provide the appropriate system of internal control using the capital adequacy requirement as the main tool but looking back at the events of financial crises (2008) we could identify the lack of risk governance requirements as one of investment banking collapse reasons. The differences in the risk weighted assets calculations across banks and countries caused to overstatement of capital adequacy ratio. implementing leverage as a supplement to an approach that takes into account the level of risk in the capital adequacy ratio in the Basel II; -implementing minimum limits for liquidity ratio to short-term and long-term requirements; -creating capital buffers to ensure the formation of capital reserves in good times which could be used during a crisis. It should be mentioned there were no requirements for corporate governance in the Basel I and II recommendations before crisis. But the one of documents which included to Basel III issued in 2010 pays a lot of attention to corporate governance in banking that illustrated even in the title -Basel Principles for Enhancing Corporate Governance. The principle 6 is devoted to the problem of risk managing. It determines the components of risk management, requirements to CRO, scope of responsibilities, stature and independence of the risk management function, resources for internal control and requirements to personnel qualifications.
According to Principles, the role of the CRO should be distinct from other executive functions and business line responsibilities, and there generally should be no "dual hatting". Formal reporting lines may vary across banks, but regardless of these reporting lines, the independence of the CRO is paramount. While the CRO may report to the CEO or other senior management, the CRO should also report and have direct access to the board and its risk committee without impediment 32 [sec 3, p.6]. Basel recommendations form the regulative framework for all commercial banks. But investment banks provide a specific range of services (table 1) , and all of them are followed by high risks both banking (internal) and external. That's why some rules could play the specific role for their performance. One of the most important issues is risk weighted assets. According to Basel II investment banks had relatively lower RWAs densities comparing to retail banks because of large trading portfolio which characterized by lower risk weights than for banking book assets. But Basel III increased the requirements for market risks estimation that could lead to improving the RWAs of investment banks.
One more factor which influence the risk management in investment banks is the portfolio maturity: the longer dated assets mean higher risk weight because of greater uncertainty in possible losses. As investment banks have long-term assets as they have the reason for raising the risks weight. Also the capital adequacy ratio declining is expected because of changing in capital structure requirements (privileged shares are excluded from common equity, subordinated debt divided by category, additional (CET1) level allocated in the structure of capital).
Taking into considerations all issues above it could be assumed that rising of risk weighted assets theoretically could lead to declining the ROA and ROE ratio. Simultaneously, strengthening the risk management system through risk recovery ratios in investment banks will not allow improving the process of decision making significantly. That's why other tools (like the adequate, strong and clear requirements to corporate governance system at al) are more appropriate for safety business activity. One of the most significant ones the CRO could be.
So, looking through basic legislation in Corporate Governance devoted to internal control issue (Appendix A, table 1) it could be made some conclusions: the risk management issues was not under active discussion since 2002; the main attention in legislation paid at audit committees requirements and internal control system (without specifying); financial crises in 2008 stimulated the development of risk governance; the CRO responsibilities, role, accountability and appointment requirements are not determined clearly.
Research framework

Sample
At the date there is a trend to elimination of borders between investment banks and commercial banks, because banking activity is becoming more universal. A lot of financial organizations are permitted to serve banking classical and investment products.
Legislation looks at the issue from another point of view and defines investment bank as a bank that assists in increasing capital by performing intermediary operations between the issuer of securities and investors, in particular underwriting, facilitating mergers and acquisitions, corporate restructuring, brokerage, market making, trading of derivative, foreign exchange, equity securities etc.
The issue is that there are no accurate criteria, for example, volume of assets in investing operations; share of incomes from investment products in net revenue; absence of deposit services and total domination of investment services. In this response one can affirm the existence of the problem of working out the features of investment banks and separating them from commercial ones.
Nowadays the bank is considered as investment in case if it positions itself as investment bank, assisting in mergers and acquisitions procedures, offering underwriting and advising services, trading of derivatives, equity securities and conducting other investment products. On the base of analysis it is proposed to divide banks conducting investment operations into three categories: 1) investments banks -those that implement investment operations only; 2) universal banks that implement both operations specific for commercial (taking deposits, giving loans) and investment banking. These are usually big banks with investment banking divisions; 3) parent universal banks that offer commercial products and have special investment affiliate that often operates with separate balance. Aiming to get an image on the point Tables 2  and 3 presents the summary of unit weight of investment operations revenue in bank's net revenue. The sample consists of observations for 29 biggest banks (by volume of assets) implementing world-wide investment activity. The banks are originated in USA (8), Eastern Europe (14), China (2), Japan (2), Canada (2), and Australia (1) ( Table 1 and 2). Figures 1 and 2 date conditions. The advantage of the sample is banks' domination on the world investment banking market both in developed countries and emerging countries. The data about risk governance structure and character in observed banks is originally collected from annual financial reports, corporate governance reports and other official presented information on the date of the end 2011. In this research, we use survey data for Chief Risk Officer (CRO) and Risk Management Committee (RMC). In the context of investigation of CRO role we took into account the following factors: presence of CRO or similar executive; CRO subordination; CRO terms of reference; qualification; access to the Board of Directors; CRO independence. We also hand-collect data concerning presence of Risk Management Committees in banks and investigated their types, depending on dealing with all or only with certain bank risks. In some investigated banks there is no Risk Committee, in this case risk management function is delegated to Audit Committee which also has been researched.
4.2.
Methodological approach and financial performance variables description
The main aim of the following article is to identify the exclusive role of Risk Management Committee in part of the Chief Risk Officer Independence in the sphere of modern investment banking. This problem has found the special relevance during and after economic collapse, which have run down the financial market in 2008.
The empirical analysis of risk governance in investment banking is based on two different groups of factors, which could be used to evaluate the effectiveness of risk governance in this sphere: internal and external factors (figure 3).
The most significant impact on the investment banks` performance in our calculations is given to the adequacy of bank capital standards according to the Basel III recommendations about the measures of Common Equity Tier 1. The fact is connected with the extremely high risk taking by investment banks during their operation activity. That's why the high measures of Common Equity Tier 1 shows the ability of investment bank to cover risky assets and to be stable during the crisis, what is particularly important after the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The null hypothesis of this paper is that observed Basel III recommendations will present significant decrease of the main bank performance factors, such as ROATA and ROE, which will have the negative influence on the general financial performance of investment banking activity. Traditional performance measures are cognate to those applied in classic banking industry, including return on average tangible assets (ROATA -Net Income/Tangible Average Assets; Tangible Assets are Total Assets minus Intangible Assets, for instance, Goodwill, Brands, and intellectual capital such as trademarks, patents, copyrights, etc.) and return on equity (ROE) being the most broadly used. As well, we have included to this group the typically important factor as Price to Book Ratio, the main aim is to compare a company`s book value to its current market price. Book value is an accounting term denoting the portion of the company held by the shareholders at accounting value (not market value). In other words, book value is the company`s total tangible assets less its total liabilities.
As a result, we assume that recommendations regarding Basel III standards about capital adequacy will negatively influence on the effectiveness of selected financial indicators (especially ROATA and ROE), in particular at high investment banks` risk assets covering, which represent the bulk of the assets structure, the figures of ROATA and ROE cannot be high enough that affect the entire operations of these financial intermediaries.
Among the wide range of investment banks` performance measures by theorists and practitioners alike, a differentiation can be made between traditional financial factors and corporate governance evaluation in the part of the CRO role. Both the financial indicators and the CRO role in the investment banking are choice variables that result to maximizing investment banks performance and establishment of banks` stability.
CRO role in the corporate governance process is used as a metric for assessing the effectiveness of corporate governance because it is frequent and 
Risk Governance Variables
In this research we collected data concerning features of Risk Committees and CRO as the main subjects of risk governance at senior level.
The The third characteristic is definition whether members of Risk Committee are executive. The research showed that in most of banks the committee is formed by all non-executive Board of Directors members; in half executive and non-executive; or only executives.
The other subgroup applies to CRO presence and characteristics. Thus, the fourth variable is presence of an official responsible for risk governance organizing in bank. These duties according to Basel Recommendations advisable should be carried out by CRO as it is implemented in selected set of banks. Bank of America Merrill Lynch, M&T Bank, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A., Bank of China Limited, Grupo Santander don't have clear distinction of risk governance duties to definite executive. Title "Chairman Credit Policy Committee" may also stand for CRO (e.g. Citi).
The fifth variable is subordination of CRO in bank, which also includes the possibility of CRO access to the Board. Their partnership intends to:
-understand the role of the Board in risk governance; -appoint more risk professionals on bank Boards; -ensure an effective Risk Committee of the Board; -enhance the independence of the risk function; -integrate board oversight of strategy and risk governance; -establish mutually supportive working relationship of the CRO and Board of Directors, free access to relevant information and data By this criterion one can distinguish three group of banks: 1st -CRO reports to the CEO (9), 2d -CRO reports to the other chief executive, for example Chief Financial Officer or a President (2), 3d -CRO reports directly to the Board (15).
In most of the sample CRO have direct access to the Board of Directors in connection with informing and advising concerning further bank risk strategy. While the CRO may report to the CEO or other senior management, the CRO should also report and have direct access to the board and its risk committee without impediment.
The sixth variable implies CRO presence in the Board of Directors. In four selected banks CRO is a member of the Board, while in some institutions they represented by Executive Board deputies (Credit Suisse) or Supervisory Board (Commerzbank AG). In individual banks Chief Risk Officer doesn't refer to governance level, but to management, that testifies practically about absence of official responsible for risk governance in bank.
Calculations and results interpretation
With the aim to evaluate and compare financial performance of selected banks the construction of synthetic key performance indicator (SKPI) is worked out. The analysis of financial performance is based on weighted four variables: common equity Tier 1 (CET 1), return on equity (ROE), return on average tangible assets (ROATA) and price to book ratio (P/B). The weight of each measure has been calculated using the first formula of Fishburn (1970) due to the fact that selected indicators are subject to a number of priorities that form the descending arithmetic sequence:
where: i r -weight of the i variable of bank's financial performance, N -total number of selected variables of bank's financial performance, j -priority level of the variable characterizing bank's financial performance.
SKPI is calculated by the following formula:
where: n -banks under research (n = 1…29). The results of calculations are presented in Appendix 2 (table 1). Investigated banks are ranked by the level of their synthetic key performance indicator and divided into 5 tires (Table 4) . 
1.
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A.
The first one consists of banks where SKPI is more than 0,21. It includes 2 banks and both of them are Canadian. This phenomen is connected with high level of B/P ratio, and it's not unexpected. /2012-09-04/most-influential-50-in-2012-shows-turmoil-bloomberg-markets.html banks. If the first ones are characterized by higher score of B/P ratio the second ones have much higher CET 1 indicator. It could be explained by the strong policy of Chinese government in banking regulation as al banks are state owned and therefore they are easier to adjust. On the one hand it constrains growth of market value, and on the other one it means higher requirements to banking. Besides, China, of all countries, was adamant that its 16 largest banks will implement Basel III recommendations in time -till January 1, 2013. Also, after reports from the U.S. to postpone the introduction of Basel, in the official press in China it was reported intention to introduce Basel rules without delay -on 1 January.
Tier 3 combines European, Australian and American banks with SKPI value from 0,1 to 0,15. The intermediate level of ratios characterizes the majority of banks, but Macquarie group limited is the exception because of high level of CET 1 and low B/P ratio. It could be explained by following issues. The Australian banking sector in 2008 was not under crisis pressure (strong banking supervision and distance), the finance sector continued to growth in 2011, so commercial banks had no losses. But the banking sector in Australia is much concentrated; the major players are 4 banks: ANZ, Commonwealth Bank (CBA), National Australia Bank (NAB) and Westpac. The Macquarie group limited credit ratings are not high enough to compete with leaders.
Tier 4 includes 11 banks with SKPI value from 0,5 to 0,1. The most interesting in these group Japanese banks are. They're characterized by high enough CET 1 (Nomura group is the leader at al) and B/P ratios but ROE is lower. It could be a consequence of the earthquake in Japan in 2011, which was reflected in reduction of performance indicators. So it could be assumed that Japanese banks will be exceptions in their group in our research.
Tier 5 consists of banks with SKPI value less than 0,05. It includes only one bank -Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena S.p.A. It has the worse result at al that could be explained as aftermath of some scandals connected to detection of corruptions schemes.
Let's have an overview of correlation between corporate governance and financial performance on the base defined variables. The tire spread of the first variable -RMC presence -is presented on the Table  5 . According to independence of risk management committee member's criteria (table 6) investigated banks were divided in 4 groups: ones which require all members in RMC are independent; majority of members (more than a half of total quantity) should be independent; the number of independent directors is less than 50% of committee; and ones which have no requirements for independent directors quantity. where: -all members in RMC are independent; -the majority of members (more than a half of total quantity) are independent; -the number of independent directors is less than 50% committee; -there are no requirements for independent directors quantity.
* some banks were excluded because of RMC absence ** it requires to contact board secretariat for getting information
It was found that worse-performed banks tend to have no requirements or non-clear requirements to independence of RMC members. The leaders are Canadian ones; American and European banks are equal in this issue and take the next position. All included Japanese banks have no requirements for RMC member's independence.
The quantity of non-executive members in RMC criteria allows to combine investigated banks in 4 groups too: all members are non-executive; the majority of members (more than a half of total quantity) are non-executive; the number of nonexecutive directors is less than 50% of committee; and ones have no requirements of non-executive directors quantity (table 7) . The data on the last three variables, devoted to CRO presence and its subordination in the bank, is shown on the Tables 8 and Table 9 . 
Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the influence of risk governance, in particular of the CRO role, on the investment banks` performance during the post-crisis period of 2011. We supplement the financial variables with the analysis of impact of CRO variables such as CRO presence in investment bank, his/her subordination and possibility of access to the Board, and CRO presence in the Board of Directors.
The most important outcome of our research is that investment banks which have special Risk Committee perform better after financial crisis than banks only with Audit Committee. With that the analysis of independence of Risk Management Committee shows that RMC with fewer requirements perform significantly worse than other investment banks in the sample. To sum up, investment banks with Chief Risk Officer (as separate position) got high level of SKPI, consequently, perform better.
Therefore, we can conclude that the RMC presence in general and the CRO in particular effect positively on the financial performance of investment banks.
The results of our paper can serve as a basis for further research; in consequence, we can get more fundamental findings, using another sample of investment banks. 
Appendix A
